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I. The Forces of Change
Technology, Prediction, and Disorder
Albert Wohlstetter*
The topic assigned to me joins in a familiar way science and tech-
nology. Not long ago this would have been irritating to pure scientists,
and in particular to someone studying abstract mathematics. The
connection is appropriate, however, because science is not very
pure. Even mathematical logic turns out, to the surprise of most of
those practising it twenty years ago, to be very useful in electronic
brains. Science and technology have always been linked; and in-
separably. As both Leonardo and Francis Bacon at the dawn of the
age of science knew very well, knowledge is not only understanding
and therefore good in itself, knowledge is also power, the mastery of
nature. Predicting is at least one condition for controlling, for chang-
ing things, shaping them to human ends. And since many of the
purposes of men conflict, knowledge also inevitably involves the power
to destroy. The duality of peaceful and warlike uses of knowledge is
intrinsic.
Just listing some new and accelerating technologies today, in the
standard way for all talks on the future of technology, will suggest
both the duality of impending change and the enormous scale of
that change: nuclear energy; synthetic new materials; the techniques
of bio- and chemo-therapy; space technology, computers or informa-
tion machines, and the closely related technology of communication;
and the possibilities of controlling weather both in the small and in
the large. Let me run rapidly through this sample list.
In the development of nuclear energy, the two-fold application for
peace or war is most obvious. Here the use for peacetime power has
been slower than originally expected, though its long-term potential to
replace fossil fuels still is very great. The tremendous scale of the
*Ford Research Professor, University of California at Berkeley.
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change is directly visible in the use of nuclear energy in military
explosives and in the transformation this has worked on military
strategy and the power relations among states.
But the major change brought by the systematic exploration of
nuclear reactions is likely to be in the massive transmutation of
elements, a nuclear alchemy more fundamental than the chemistry of
new materials and capable of almost unimaginable effects on our
technology. In any case it is apparent that synthetic new materials
will continue to benefit-and to disrupt-the world division of labor
and the life of all of us, including especially life in the raw-materials-
producing, less developed countries.
The widespread application of antibiotics and other modem medi-
cal and public health techniques will work wonders, as it has already,
in the life span of people-and the possibilities of biological warfare
illustrate the basic duality. But some of the peacetime uses sometimes
seem as problematic as they are beneficial, as in the unexpected
changes in the local balance of nature that have alarmed readers of
Miss Rachel Carson, or in the critical case of the enormous and
violent increase in the numbers of humans living-and needing work,
food, and living space.
Space travel and space technology offer no promising solution for
the population crowding problem. But the peacetime application in
communication satellites is already patent, as is the use of satellites
for detection and warning in time of war, and for the transmission of
wartime commands and possibly for bombardment.
One of the central and fastest developments, of course, has been
in computers or information machines, the so-called electronic brains.
These have been essential in guided missiles and other aspects of
military defense. They are playing a major role in almost all the
other developments I have mentioned. They are in essence, as the
name "information machine" suggests, an improvement in communi-
cations within a mechanism or an organization. Capabilities of com-
munication, both in the sense of transmitting messages as well as in
the broader sense that includes transporting men and materials, are
accelerating enormously and are one of the plainest evidences of the
increasingly tight-sometimes uncomfortably tight-connection of
every part of the world to every other.
The last potential for changing nature that I shall mention, the
ability to control weather, is still little understood; it is only in its
dim beginnings in the small-scale, local attempts at rain-making.
Even here, as public discussion has suggested, one locality might
benefit at the expense of another, as in the diversion of water from
a river. But the drastic changes in climate and in the atmosphere
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which might be effected by men-and are the subject of speculation
today-include changes in the level of the seas, possible flooding of
continental shelves and coastal cities, the long-term warming of vast
regions and cooling of others. Quite apart from their deliberate use
in warfare, the possibilities of diverging interests here dwarf anything
we have seen in the Arab-Israeli disputes over the River Jordan, or
even the water disputes between California and Arizona.
A mere roll-call then of the possible changes coming in our power
to change things can be inspiring. Or terrifying. And usually both.
Sometimes, in fact, the possibilities are presented in pairs. We are
told we will have either the cataclysm or paradise, a world of light.
But even the paradise can be pretty terrifying, as is reflected in the
fantasies of Aldous Huxley or in the current actual fears of automa-
tion. As a result, talks on the future of science and technology tend
to be a competition in ominousness.
Prophets of technological change-or even a man writing an essay
on impending changes in our enormous power to change things-may,
I find, take on the awesome attributes of their subject matter. Some of
all that massive power seems to rub off on the fellow who merely
announces it, as if he could evoke the enormous benefits or the de-
struction he foretells, like a soothsayer or caster of spells. This has
its advantages and temptations. Like the soothsayers, and unlike
the messenger who brought bad news to the king in the past, mes-
sengers of technological bad news today have an assured welcome
in the community. It is almost an occupation.
However, as I have said, control involves as a necessary condition
successful prediction. And the prophecy business in technology is
very shaky. Its aura of power is sustained in good part because
we do not keep tabs on how pronouncements on the future of science
and technology turn out. Such scorecards would almost always prove
chastening. Even some of the successful examples of extraordinary
prescience, I have found when I recently had occasion to look at them
closely, were rather more like the prophecies of Nostradamus than
predictions deduced from a finished scientific theory. There are, of
course, many notorious examples of unsuccessful prophecies-plain
bum guesses-by famous and excellent scientists. There was Simon
Newcomb's demonstration, published a few years after the Wright
Brothers flew at Kittyhawk, that "no possible combination of known
substances, known forms of machine, and known forms of force can be
united in a practicable machine by which men shall fly long distances
through the air."' For Newcomb, an American scientist of the first




rank, "this demonstration" seemed "as complete as is possible for the
demonstration of any physical fact to be."2 Then there was the great
Rutherford's judgment, less than a decade before the first sustained
nuclear chain reaction, that we were never likely to be able to
control atomic energy to a useful extent. Forecasts by distinguished
scientists of the growth and spread of nuclear weapons and rockets,
in spite of a good deal of folklore to the contrary, far from being highly
accurate, have hit not only the bull's eye, but on all sides of the target
date; and sometimes these scattered shots in the dark were fired by
the same marksman. This is nothing new. One of the best and most
ambitious attempts to foresee the next ten to twenty-five years of our
technical future was put out in 1937,3 and among other things missed
totally: nuclear energy, antibiotics, radar, and jet propulsion.
Large changes are clearly impending, but the inability to foresee
how fast they will come or even what they will be should not surprise
us. The difficulty is in part in the very nature of research. Finished
science, or at least tentatively completed theory, enables us to pre-
dict. But trying to prophesy the future of science is something else
again. It is predicting what we will discover, guessing what the dark
will reveal when lit up. If we knew we would not need the research.
"[lit is in the nature of research," as Robert Oppenheimer has put it,
that "you pay your 'two bits' first, that you go in and you don't know
what you're going to see."4
When we think we know what we'll see or won't see, we sometimes
don't do the research, even though we need it. The brilliant English
geneticist, C. D. Darlington, has written very eloquently on the ob-
stacles to further discovery that in this way can be erected within
the ranks of science itself. "It is no accident," he thinks, "that bacteria
were first seen under the microscope by a draper, that stratigraphy
was first understood by a canal engineer, that oxygen was first isolated
by a Unitarian minister, that the theory of infection was first es-
tablished by a chemist, the theory of heredity by a monastic school
teacher, and the theory of evolution by a man who was unfitted to
be a university instructor in either botany or zoology."5
This resistance to the new within science itself troubles some of the
proposals for departments or ministries of science and technology
which come up from time to time, here and in England. Professor
Darlington feels that great organs of authority, even in science-the
2. Ibid.
3. SuBcoMnMITEE ON TECHNOLOGY TO THE NATIONAL RESOURCES ComrMfrTEE,
TECHNOLOGICAL TREN¢S AND NATIONAL POLICY, INCLUDING THE SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS
OF NEW INVENTIONS (1937).
4. OPPENHEIm, THE OPEN MIND 7 (1955).
5. DAnLINGTON, THE CONFLICT OF SCIENCE AND SOCIETY 5 (1948).
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scientific journals and the schools, the royal societies-tend so quickly
to get stuck in the mud that what we need instead of a Ministry of
Science is a Ministry of Disturbance, "a regulated source of annoyance;
a destroyer of routine, an underminer of complacency, an enfant
terrible."6
"Pure" (or fairly pure) science stimulated by the obscurity of its
future, is moved to resolve uncertainty. But it is also troubled by
false presumptions as to what that future might be, and the situation
is rather worse for applied science or technology. One of the main
reasons for this is that the progress of technology is not purely a mat-
ter of invention. It has to do with such grubby matters as costs, and
uses, and competing purposes: in short, with politics, sociology, eco-
nomics, and military strategy. When even a great physicist talks of
the future of technology, he isn't talking physics, but of matters which,
if less profound, are enormously more complicated. Experience and
all the academic disciplines devoted to illuminating these matters
shed only a very dispersed, flickering, and fitful light. But they are
all we have.
The implications of present and future technology for our future
course of action are much agitated in the current discussion. I am
going to refer to two sorts of analyses to illustrate the limits of our
understanding and the implications of these limits. Let me call the
one the Small World and the other the Big World analysis.
First the Small World. All of the fast-growing technologies I have
described earlier have in common that they enable us from any one
point on earth to affect any other point and to do this with increasing
speed and effectiveness. This will be true eventually of weather
control-with massive possible effect. It is already nearly true of the
possibilities of transportation and quite true of weapons delivery. It is
nearly true of communications, but also of thought control. There is
no longer space on earth simply to extend the area of operation of a
technology. In this sense, we have run up against the finite limits of
the earth. Not only can the range of delivery of weapons cover the
earth completely from any point, but the area of destruction against
unprotected targets is very large in relation to the accuracy of this
delivery. There is very little time and room to absorb a blow and
devise a response. The Atlantic and Pacific oceans and the distance
from the Russian border to Moscow no longer suffice to shelter the
United States and Russia. Moreover, the spread of nuclear weapons
to more powers is likely to increase the instability, making both more
complicated the problem of deterring surprise attack and more diffi-
cult the task of reducing the chance of war through "accidents" or
6. Id. at 50.
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misunderstanding, or the like. The great mathematician, John Von
Neumann, suggested that a war between existing nations of the
current size and closeness, with weapons of impending range and
destructiveness, would be as unstable as a war with the weapons of
1900 confined to Manhattan Island. For this reason he felt that the
world had become "under-sized and under-organized."
One sort of inference typically drawn by scientists and technologists
from this line of thinking (though not in his later years by Von Neu-
mann) is the immediate necessity for world-wide agreement in con-
trolling the technology of destruction-a control that amounts to
organizing the separate sovereignties into one world-simply because
the destructive implications of technology are so awful. To use the
stark alternatives that were stated at the very start of the nuclear age,
it is One World or None. One world, these technologists say, is a
political necessity.
While scientists and technologists at the end of the war stressed
with great urgency the necessity of one world, events, it seemed, were
moving in another direction-towards the multiplication of sovereign-
ties. Membership in the United Nations doubled and is on its way to
tripling. It may be that the United Nations itself, with its one-nation
one-vote and the large forum that it provides small powers, may en-
courage this multiplication. It offers some incentives to the leaders of
small subdivisions of former colonies to achieve separate sovereignty
status and to play a role on the world scene. In any case it is clear
that we have not been going steadily toward one world.
This actual and growing diversity of the world receives some notice
in the second view of the world and technology. That view I have
for the sake of contrast identified as the Big World. It is represented
by several distinguished diplomats, historians and writers on foreign
affairs.
Let me read a central passage from the recent work of one who is
all three: diplomat, fine historian, and thoughtful critic of foreign
policy.
Many Americans seem unable to recognize the technical difficulties in-
volved in the operation of far-flung lines of power-the difficulty of trying
to exert power from any given national center over areas greatly remote
from that center. There are, believe me, limits to the effective radius of
political power from any center in the world. It is vitally important to
remember this, particularly in the face of the fears one hears constantly
expressed today that the Russians want universal power and will be likely
to take over the world if we fail to do this or that.
There is no magic by which great nations are brought to obey for any
length of time the will of people very far away who understand their prob-
lems poorly and with whom they feel no intimacy of origin or understanding.
This has to be done by bayonets, or it is not done at all. This is the reason
[VOL.. 17
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
why, despite all that is said about Soviet expansion, the power of the
Kremlin extends precisely to those areas which it is able to dominate
with its own armed forces, without involving impossible lines of communica-
tion, and no farther. There are geographic limits to the possibilities of
military occupation; and such colonial regimes as can occasionally be suc-
cessfully established at points remote from the ostensible center soon
develop, as has been demonstrated time and time again since the days of
the Byzantine Empire, a will and identity of their own and become in-
creasingly ineffective as instruments. In this way, the exercise of centralized
power is gradually reduced, once more, to something like its natural limits.
What I am asserting is that uriversal world dominion is a technical im-
possibility, and that the effectiveness of the power radiated from any one
national center decreases in proportion to the distance involved ....
This view of the world then stresses that power is finite, that it
diminishes in proportion to distance from its center, and concludes
that-at least for any length of time-world dominion by Russia or
any other single power is a technological impossibility. The theory
frequently goes with a stress on the apparent growth of many centers
of power, and in particular the growth in the importance of small
powers. On the whole this multipolarity is taken as making the
world more stable. But as for One World, on this view it is technically
infeasible.
It is something of a paradox, contemplating these two views of the
world, that the technologists insist that One World is a political
necessity and the diplomats and political historians assure us that it
is technically infeasible.
The diplomats and historians who view the world as large com-
pared to the limits of technology, show an attractive and persuasive
awareness of the diversity of competing national goals, the problems
in the exercise of power, and the factual limits both to power and
to national ambitions. These are matters that technologists tend to
brush over all too lightly. Nonetheless, this view of the world has
problems. For one thing, though military power comes in several
varieties, none that I have examined in terms of the technology of
nuclear or conventional warfare today falls off so neatly in a straight
line from the power center. Even for conventional combat sometimes
the costs of getting to a theater of war are very small and the capa-
bilities very large, compared to the costs and capabilities of moving
about inside the theater. And since the comparative advantage inside
the theater may depend on many highly local phenomena-terrain and
local transportation and communication-it sometimes turns out that
a distant foe actually has an advantage over one nearby, whose access
through local roads, ports, and airfields may be very poor. In the
case of nuclear war the cushioning effects of space are much more
radically transformed. And how important distance is will depend on
1963]
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what your objectives are. An aggressor may be considerably helped
by proximity. But a so-called "second-strike capability" is likely to be
aided by distance.
In any case the old geopolitical considerations on the balance of
power which typify the Big World view, whatever their worth for
past history, are too schematic and dubious to be very reassuring
about the stability of the present world today.
Nor is the theory very reassuring about Soviet ambitions, though
it seems the emphasis on the impossibility of world domination by any
one power is meant to be. For one thing, all we are assured is that
great nations will not obey a distant will "for any length of time."
But even a short time-like the duration of the Byzantine Empire-
could be unpleasant. Moreover, even if we assumed that total world
dominion by a single power was infeasible, this is not completely
comforting. A world divided between several nuclear-armed con-
tending communist powers, for example, might, if possible, be even
worse. And finally we must ask how the finite limit to the effective
radius of power which is stressed by these writers compares with that
other finite limit stressed by the holders of the Small World view.
How does the technical limit of power compare with the size of the
globe? To be specific, is it less than twelve thousand nautical miles?
That's hallway round. Two paths of that length starting from the
same center could meet at the opposite side of the globe.
And the old empires, when you come right down to it, were rather
impressive in extent. I have made some very rough estimates and
some rather unreliable calculations. I find that a direct path from
Byzantium to the farthest extent of Justinian's domain on the Iberian
Peninsula comes within a factor of three or four of making it halfway
round the world. Justinian did pretty well. Genghis and Kublai Khan
did even better than that-and, as my friend John Williams points out,
with ponies. Communications and transportation have improved by
very much larger factors than three or four. It used to take from
a month to two months to go from Byzantium to Rome. Now jets can
make it in hours, rockets in minutes. And while no one who has put
a telephone call through from Istanbul-today's Byzantium-to Rome
would ever think that arranging the connection is done with nearly
the speed of light, still, the improvement over Justinian is tremendous.
On the technical limits the Small World theory and the technicians
are more plausible.
Our adversaries are restrained, but not by what is technically feasi-
ble. Long before technical limits are reached, they are restrained by
the diversity of their goals and by the costs of doing us in; and
therefore by us. But the diversity of goals is essential. The diplomats
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and political historians are on firm ground when-in contrast to most
of the technologists writing on strategy-they stress the complexity
and multiplicity of political objectives. The Communists are pre-
occupied with a good many other problems than doing us in by force
of arms. There are all the indirect methods and there are the problems
of their own internal development, and the quarrels with their friends
as to which one will do us in and how, and a good many other
domestic and foreign concerns. No country in the communist or non-
communist world has ever pursued the arms race with the single-
minded ferocity assumed in the simple models constructed by writers
on strategy and military technology. The world is getting small in
relation to what is technically feasible, but it is not getting simple.
There are more severe limitations in the simplicity of the strategic
and political views of the technologists. Technologists tend to treat
these political and military problems as if they were pure technology.
But as I have already suggested, in practice within any given nation
a decision to speed the development and production of nuclear wea-
pons or bombers or rockets will be affected by the costs of such a
program, the many competing national purposes for which the same
resources might be used, and the apparent rewards. The rewards
themselves depend upon the behavior of other nations beyond national
control, and the expected payoffs may in some cases be rather easily
frustrated. So in spite of the great scientific competence of the Eng-
lish, their costly rocket program, the Blue Streak, turned out to be of
very dubious value and was cancelled, not because of any technical
failure in realizing the original plans, but because of the much greater
capabilities the more powerful Russians have for getting counter-
measures. Not nature, but the Russians, spoiled the original plans.
Feasible Russian countermeasures would have found the Blue Streak
vulnerable on re-entry from space, but even more vulnerable on the
ground before it was ever launched.
Some scientists and technologists talk of the imminent appearance
of rocket programs so cheap that they will be available not merely to
poor countries, but to rather wealthy individuals, a new sort of nuclear
dilettante. In fact, military programs for nuclear weapons and de-
livery systems with other than ornamental utility or totally irresponsi-
ble use are an enormous enterprise. They have been rather
consistently underestimated. Until very recently studies of the dif-
fusion problem considered only what it would take for new entrants
to the nuclear club just to make bombs, as if the bombs would deliver
themselves and be unopposed. And it is still extremely rare in such
studies to consider the delivery problem in a serious way, with full
account taken of the problems of operating and controlling nuclear
1963]
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forces in the face of possible enemy counters.
The spread of nuclear weapons is a genuine problem and an im-
portant one. But the time scale for this diffusion and its characteristics
have been woefully misrepresented by men who have taken the
problem as one of improving technology to cut the cost of a stand-
ardized and universally desired product. When considered realisti-
cally, however, it becomes apparent that the product is highly complex
and the standards it has to meet are continuously changing. Nuclear
retaliatory systems have not been going down in price, but up. The
first 100 B-58's, Atlas, or submarine-launched Polaris cost three to
five times more than the first 100 B-47's. Wealthy dilettantes don't
appear to be a very promising immediate market. In fact diffusion has
gone very much more slowly than was predicted at the end of the
war. And prophecy continues to be quickly outmoded by events.
Only three years ago, Sir Charles Snow forecast at least a dozen new
entrants to the nuclear club by 1966.7 Nothing of the kind is likely to
happen.
Technologists who hold the small world view tend to assume not
only that any country will acquire all means of destruction within its
technical capacity, but also that once acquired these weapons are sure
to be used-"sooner or later." So we have had a flood of predictions
that nuclear war is statistically certain before the end of the decade.
The danger of nuclear war is a very real one. But this sort of
prophecy has no empirical foundation whatsoever. Sometimes the cer-
tainty of nuclear war is presented as a mathematical matter. Given
a fixed probability of war, no matter how small it is, so long as it is
greater than zero, "sooner or later" the nuclear holocaust will come.
In this form, however, the prediction is mathematically impeccable
but trivial. It has no empirical content, offers no index for action. It
tells us essentially nothing. An equally impeccable bit of algebra
would show that the outbreak of the rule of law and eternal peace is
statistically certain-"sooner or later." This argument would run: In
any given year there is some probability that the total rule of law
among nations and the peaceful settlement of disputes will come
into being. This probability may be very tiny right now, but it is
greater than zero. And not decreasing. Well then, "sooner or later
... ." The parallel argument about the statistical certainty of nuclear
war should be no more terrifying than this argument, for the statistical
certainty of eternal peace is reassuring.
Such impeccable but empty statistical arguments are very common
-even among Nobel Laureates in physics. Still more common is the
assertion that the probability of war in any given year increases year
7. Snow, The Moral Un-Neutrality of Science, Science, Jan. 1961, p. 255, 259.
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by year. For a variety of reasons, I believe this one simply to be
wrong as a matter of fact. On the evidence of the greatly decreased
vulnerability of our strategic force and the greatly increased centrali-
zation of command over nuclear weapons, the probability both of
deliberate attack on the United States forces and of their unauthorized
or "accidental" or miscalculated use has declined in the last decade.
Most frequently what we get are bare predictions that the proba-
bility of war is very high in some next period of years. However, I
have recently run through the history of these predictions and can
report something that is, at least partially, reassuring. They show a
trend.
For example, one physicist of the first rank in 1945 was most pessi-
mistic about the post-war years. He said, "If we manage to get through
the next fifteen years alive, we shall probably emerge immune to
atomic bombs." The next prediction I came across by this same
physicist fell, as it happens, in the year 1960, that is, fifteen years later.
He did not then feel that we were immune to atom bombs. But he
now talked of the probability of war in the following forty years. An-
other physicist, a friend of mine and former colleague, was saying not
very long ago that unless we had comprehensive arms control by 1970
the probability of war was extremely high. A little later he moved
the date to 1975; and I was somewhat relieved to find him writing
recently that, with average luck, we just might last out the century.
I do not intend to minimize the dangers of nuclear war. They are,
as I have said, very real. I believe that the most important goal of
both our national defense and our foreign policy must continue to be
to reduce the probability of war, year by year, and step by step. How-
ever, there is no basis for the statements that are made almost every
day which fix the length of our lease on life. I feel moreover that all
the urgent statements indicating that the lease is nearly up have some
very large defects. Most important, they pretend to a knowledge of
the future which we do not have, a knowledge not only of the tech-
nology but also of the evolving political and economic scene. Second,
they lead not to science or politics, but to eschatology: they point to
the establishment on this finite earth in the near future of an im-
probably final arrangement for settling the deep antagonisms between
the East and the West and in fact among all nations. In doing this
they express our wishes, but not our sober estimates of the durability
of the antagonisms themselves. They focus on time intervals that are
very little understood and ignore some time constants on which we
have a good deal of empirical evidence.
We are in the dark about the future of science and technology, still
more about the long-term future of military and political developments
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
in the world arena. We should be extremely skeptical, therefore, if
sweeping predictions on any subject come tied to a prescription, an
exhortation for urgent and sweeping action. We have all heard the
apocalyptic pairs of alternatives: "Destroy the Russians or they'll
destroy us;" or "Disarm or face world annihilation." These are counsels
of desperation, fear of the dark. They abandon not only patience, but
intelligence.
However, if uncertainty is hard to tolerate, it is nonetheless a very
pervasive and hard fact of life. It demands today flexibility, prepared-
ness to change direction with new knowledge, and the use of every
shred of knowledge that we have. This last includes our knowledge of
the glacial slowness of the cold war's receding. We have interests
in common with our opponents, but we deceive ourselves when we
talk of these as overriding all others. The utopian proposals urged
today by so many scientists and technologists ignore the durability of
our political problems by calling for a final and immediate solution.
As if the problem of peace were not enough to settle all at once,
such prescriptions for its solution are frequently coupled with recipes
for solving the extraordinarily resistant troubles of the less developed
countries. It is frequently suggested that we can stabilize the peace
and launch the less developed countries into self-sustaining growth
at one stroke, simply by devoting all or most of the money spent on
national defenses throughout the world to provide capital for these
areas. Such formulae hardly take seriously either problem: keeping
the peace or economic development. Economic and political self-
development for the less developed areas is not at all likely to be
accomplished either quickly or by any simple formula. Not, for ex-
ample, simply by large infusions of capital.
Utopian hopes also flourish in the less developed countries. The
stereotyped phrase, "the revolution of rising expectations," sometimes
denotes the awareness by the poor of the great gap between the poor
and the rich countries. But any suggestion that this gap is likely to
be closed in a matter of years, or even decades, encourages false hopes.
The stereotype would be better phrased "the revolution of excessive
expectations." These problems of technological backwardness, like
the problems set by the extreme advance in military technology, are
not simply technological. They are embedded in traditional ways of
life that offer small incentive to innovation.
Innovation in any case will be no cure-all. The facile assumption
that headlong economic development has some automatic connection
with the development of democratic forms is little evidenced. The
fragmentary evidence available, for example, in the studies of Sey-
mour Martin Lipset, suggests that in the periods of social dis-
[VOL. 17
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
location characteristic of rapid industrial advance, totalitarian forms
may flourish. Advance, once achieved, can furnish a firm and partial
basis for political democracy. But the process of innovation and swift
technological advance can be painful. The ecstatic and violent millen-
nial movements of medieval and reformation Europe exploded pre-
cisely at the times and places where change had uprooted peasants
and journeymen, torn them from the support, as well as the con-
straints, of kinship, and thrown them into towns.
Millennial prescriptions of scientists and technologists in the ad-
vanced countries for the economic development of backward areas,
with their simple stress on technology alone and the supply of indus-
trial capital, sometimes even just electric power, form an unfortunately
perfect match for some of the millennial characteristics of the leader-
ship in newly independent countries.
John Von Neumann, who of all the scientists wrote most perceptively
of our burgeoning technology and small finite world, did not draw
the utopian conclusions of many who cite him. On the contrary, he
wrote, "[I]t is unreasonable to expect a novel cure-all."
For progress there is no cure. Any attempt to find automatically safe
channels for the present explosive variety of progress must lead to frustra-
tion. The only safety permissible is relative, and it lies in an intelligent
exercise of day-to-day judgment.
The one solid fact is that the difficulties are due to an evolution that, while
useful and constructive, is also dangerous. Can we produce the required
adjustments with the necessary speed? The most hopeful answer is that
the human species has been subjected to similar tests before and seems to
have a congenital ability to come through, after varying amounts of trouble.
To ask in advance for a complete recipe would be unreasonable. We can
specify only the human qualities required: patience, flexibility, intelligence. 8
The sense of my own remarks is much the same. There are without
doubt large changes in technology impending. But how fast they
will come and just what they will be is not really predictable. Still
less are the widespread political and economic consequences of these
changes. The future of technology is dark-not black, but obscure. It
is better, then, to direct our steps by the small and fitful illumination
that we have and will obtain-to move with intelligence rather than
simply to make one grand leap in the dark.
The actual rule of law is not likely to come all at once, like the
mythical social contract of the eighteenth century philosophers. It
will not break out all of a sudden. Instead, it is more likely to be built
opportunistically and piecemeal like the common law.
8. Von Neumann, Can We Survive Technology?, Fortune, June 1955, p. 106, 152.
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The changes coming are neither intrinsically benign nor malign.
In any case they are best not viewed in terms of the apocalypse or the
millennium. The apocalypse might come, but it need not. And the
millennium is not about to.
